Research

Publications and Forthcoming Papers

• Asymmetric Group Loan Contracts: Experimental Evidence
  with B. Uras, S. Suetens, and P. Visser.
  Accepted at the Journal of the Economic Science Association.

• The Role of Risky Debt and Safe Assets in Unregulated Financial Intermediaries with Costly State Verification
  with P. Gomis-Porqueras. Economic Theory 80, 203–239 (2025).

• E-Money, Risk Sharing, and Welfare
  with B. Uras. European Economic Review 169 (2024), 104832.

• Imperfect Competition in the Banking Sector and Macroeconomic Instability
  with L. Modesto and T. Loyd-Braga. Journal of Mathematical Economics 112 (2024), 102968.

• Sovereign Default, Fiscal Policy, and Macroeconomic Instability
  with L. Modesto. Journal of Public Economic Theory 24 (2022), 1386–1412.

• Transparency and Collateral: Central versus Bilateral Clearing
  with G. Antinolfi and F. Carapella. Theoretical Economics 17 (2022), 185–217.

• Real Consequences of Open Market Operations: The Role of Limited Commitment
  with P. Gomis-Porqueras. European Economic Review 132 (2021).

• Endogenous Credit and Investment Cycles with Asset Price Volatility
  with L. Modesto. Macroeconomic Dynamics 22(7) (2018), 1859–1874.

• Joint Liability with Endogenously Asymmetric Group Loan Contracts
  with B. Uras. Journal of Development Economics 127 (2017), 72–90.

• Costly Monitoring, Dynamic Incentives, and Default
  with G. Antinolfi. Journal of Economic Theory 159 (2015), 105–119.

Working Papers

Reviving Joint-Liability Contracts: Asymmetric Joint Liability Loans with Moral Hazard
with F. Cecchi, M. Fritz, B. Uras, and R. Lensink

We study the effects of asymmetric joint liability on peer monitoring, moral hazard, and default in microfinance. We develop a structural model of group lending under moral hazard and test its implications in a lab-in-the-field experiment with microfinance clients in urban Bolivia. The model shows that symmetric joint liability contracts can weaken incentives for peer monitoring and lead to coordinated defaults. By designating one group member as a lead borrower with differential interest rates, asymmetric joint liability restores monitoring incentives and mitigates moral hazard. Consistent with the model, experimental evidence shows that asymmetric joint liability contracts increase peer monitoring and loan repayment, particularly among borrowers who find joint liability acceptable.

Selected Work in Progress

Social Norms and Excess Transfer Progressivity in the Village
(with Albert Rodriguez Sala and Raul Santaeulalia-Llopis)

Optimal Monetary Policy under Incomplete Financial Markets when Money Is Essential
(with Gaetano Antinolfi and Enrique Kawamura)